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Sexual selection is a key component of evolutionary biology. However, from the very formulation of sexual selection by Darwin, the nature 
and extent of sexual selection have been controversial. Recently, such controversy has led back to the fundamental question of just what 
sexual selection is. This has included how we incorporate female-female reproductive competition into sexual or natural selection. In this 
review, we do four things. First, we examine what we want a definition to do. Second, we define sexual selection: sexual selection is any 
selection that arises from fitness differences associated with nonrandom success in the competition for access to gametes for fertilization. 
An important outcome of this is that as mates often also offer access to resources, when those resources are the targets of the competition, 
rather than their gametes, the process should be considered natural rather than sexual selection. We believe this definition encapsulates 
both much of Darwin’s original thinking about sexual selection, and much of how contemporary biologists use the concept of sexual selec-
tion. Third, we address alternative definitions, focusing in some detail on the role of female reproductive competition. Fourth, we challenge 
our definition with a number of scenarios, for instance where natural and sexual selection may align (as in some forms of endurance rivalry), 
or where differential allocation means teasing apart how fecundity and access to gametes influence fitness. In conclusion, we emphasize 
that whilst the ecological realities of sexual selection are likely to be complex, the definition of sexual selection is rather simple.
Key words:  natural selection, sexual selection.
INTRODUCTION
Sexual selection has a contentious history. Originally, sexual selec-
tion was proposed by Darwin (1859, 1871) to explain the evolu-
tion of  traits that do not appear to increase longevity or fecundity, 
and so would not be favored by natural selection. Whilst the rest of  
the Darwinian view of  evolution has been widely accepted, sexual 
selection has remained a focus of  debate and argument for more 
than a century and a half  (Cronin 1991; Andersson 1994; Kokko 
et  al. 2006; Alonzo and Servedio 2019). First, the very notion of  
sexual selection itself  proved less acceptable to early evolutionary 
biologists than natural selection, no doubt in part due to social at-
titudes at the time. For instance, Darwin removed the very term 
“sexual selection” from the title of  The Descent of  Man at the behest 
of  his publisher John Murray, leaving instead the rather mangled 
“selection in relation to sex” (Dawson 2007), which has perhaps led 
to some misinterpretations of  Darwin’s ideas (see below).
Second, Darwin was clearly aware of  the potentially scandalous 
nature of  sexual selection, and especially the idea of  mate pref-
erences. For example, he left the discussion of  some human male 
mate preferences for certain female morphological attributes to 
a footnote written in Latin (Darwin 1871, p. 345; Dawson 2007). 
Mate choice in particular failed to gain widespread acceptance 
with Darwin’s contemporaries and those who came after. This may 
have been because Darwin emphasized female mate choice, and 
the idea of  female animals expressing an “aesthetic taste” may 
have been hard to swallow, although there were notable exceptions 
(for example Peckham and Peckham 1889, 1890; see also Cronin 
1991; Hamlin 2014). Certainly, the idea of  male–male compe-
tition was more widely accepted, not least because male combat 
for mates was self-evident in animals such as rutting ungulates or 
horned beetles (Emlen 2008, 2014; for various perspectives on the 
history of  sexual selection see for instance Cronin 1991, Andersson 
1994, and Milam 2010).
Third, the resurgence of  interest in sexual selection in the 1970s 
and 1980s (for example Campbell 1972; Blum and Blum 1979; 
Bateson 1983; Thornhill and Alcock 1983; Smith 1984; Bradbury 
and Andersson 1987; reviewed by Andersson 1994) also brought 
forth controversy. This resurgence included the rehabilitation of  
mate choice as a potent evolutionary mechanism, on the back of  
ground-breaking theoretical and empirical papers (Lande 1981; 
Andersson 1982; Kirkpatrick 1982). However, why those mate pref-
erences evolved has proved challenging for theorists to understand 
and for empiricists to test. Mate choice associated with direct bene-
fits (such as access to parental care, resources, or territories) has 
always been relatively straightforward to comprehend (Andersson 
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1994). Mate choice when males only provide sperm to females, 
and thus genes to offspring, remains contentious though (for recent 
discussions see Ingleby et al. 2010; Prum 2010; Hunt and Hosken 
2014; Rosenthal 2017; Achorn and Rosenthal 2020).
Fourth, the conceptual basis of  sexual selection was more re-
cently challenged in a highly controversial paper (Roughgarden 
et  al. 2006 and resulting commentaries). Whilst much of  that 
paper has had little bearing on what sexual selection researchers 
do and think, perhaps the most relevant fall-out was attempts to 
redefine or reinterpret what sexual selection actually is. This has 
included reconsidering the role of  females in sexual selection (for 
example LeBas 2006; Clutton-Brock 2007, 2009, 2017; Rosvall 
2011; Stockley and Bro-Jørgensen 2011; Tobias et  al. 2012; Hare 
and Simmons 2019) and also the consideration of  new definitions 
of  sexual selection (for example Carranza 2009; see discussion in 
Shuker 2010, 2014; Alonzo and Servedio 2019).
Here we will explore definitions of  sexual selection, provide what 
we think is the most suitable definition, and attempt to bring con-
ceptual clarity to a concept about which there has perhaps been 
some intellectual complacency. We will begin by considering what 
a definition of  sexual selection should and should not be able to 
achieve, then we will provide a definition, which will be familiar to 
many readers, before discussing alternative definitions and finally 
cases that push our definition to the limit. We will need to discuss 
how natural and sexual selection interact, and to do so we will 
follow Endler (1986) by considering sexual selection to be a compo-
nent of  “broad-sense” natural selection. “Narrow-sense” natural se-
lection will be used to describe other components of  fitness, such as 
longevity, fecundity, and parental investment (see below for a fuller 
discussion of  this terminology).
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A DEFINITION OF 
SEXUAL SELECTION
A definition of  sexual selection should fulfill a number of  criteria. 
First, it needs to be sex neutral (that is, not dependent on a given 
sex or sexual function). This is because both males and females 
may present traits that are under sexual selection, even in the same 
species. Moreover, in species in which there are no sexes, that is 
isogamous species such as Saccharomyces yeasts, individuals within a 
mating type may compete for mates in a way that recalls sexual 
selection in anisogamous species (for example Rogers et  al. 2009; 
Reding et al. 2013). In other words, a definition of  sexual selection 
should require neither sexes nor specific sex roles (Shuker 2010, 
2014).
Second, a definition of  sexual selection should identify – in ge-
neral terms – what individuals are competing for. Competition is 
important here. DNA sequences are competing for representation 
in the next generation, competition that can occur even if  a pop-
ulation is expanding rapidly in size. An attempt to divorce sexual 
selection from the notion of  competition was part of  the critique of  
sexual selection put forward by Roughgarden et  al. (2006). Those 
authors wanted to view interactions between individuals in terms 
of  reproduction as cooperative, with males and females working 
together as a “team.” However, cooperation – like selfishness – is 
just another strategy by which organisms may increase their genetic 
representation in the next generation, at the expense of  others. After all, 
cooperation is in the eye of  the beholder – your cooperation may 
be my cronyism and corruption. Putting forward cooperation in 
opposition to competition is therefore misguided and misinterprets 
levels of  explanation. Darwin himself  made it clear that selection 
is all about doing better than rivals, whether that be through team-
work or aggression.
On the other hand, there are some things that we should not 
expect a definition of  sexual selection to be able to sort out for us. 
To begin with, sexual selection should be agnostic about (that is, 
unconcerned with) other components of  fitness. In other words, it 
should not be defined in terms of  other forms of  selection. If  it 
is, then sexual selection risks becoming contingent on other forms 
of  selection that may or may not be present, which does not seem 
satisfactory to us. This might seem a reasonable proposition, but 
Darwin of  course mentioned sexual selection in terms of  traits that 
natural selection did not appear to favor (Darwin 1871, for example 
pp 278-279). This opposition to natural selection is still often em-
phasized, for instance when natural selection halts the exaggeration 
of  sexually selected ornaments in models of  mate choice (Lande 
1981; Andersson 1994). However, when he introduced sexual selec-
tion in the first edition of  The Origin, Darwin noted from the outset 
that males with the greatest “general vigour” (that is, most favored 
by natural selection) may also be the most successful at winning 
mates (Darwin 1859). Here, natural and sexual selection both favor 
“general vigour” and are not in opposition. What this means is that 
empirically we may not necessarily be able to discriminate between 
fitness associated with sexual selection, and fitness associated with 
other components of  selection, if  those fitness components partially 
or completely align (Darwin 1871, p. 257; Andersson 1994). However, 
it is an empirical problem that we should expect to face, given the 
countless ways in which components of  fitness may instantiate 
themselves across the tangled bank of  ecologies organisms inhabit 
in the wild.
Many mechanisms can result in sexual selection (Table 1). 
However, a definition of  sexual selection should not be tied to 
one or more mechanisms of  sexual selection, such as mate choice 
or male–male competition. This is important, as much of  the 
Roughgarden et  al (2006) critique focused on sexual selection 
through female mate choice, and indeed other recent reviews have 
tended to equate the two (for example Kuijper et al. 2012; a sim-
ilar point was made by McCullough et al. 2016). Arguments over 
mate choice for instance – however prominent historically and con-
temporaneously – should not distract us from a more fundamental 
definition of  sexual selection. Indeed, clarity over the definition 
of  sexual selection may help the field from becoming preoccupied 
with one or other form of  sexual selection.
This is not to say that we would not like a body of  theory that 
makes specific predictions about how sexual selection arises, or in-
deed that predicts specific traits or trait values favored by sexual 
selection. Fortunately, we do have that body of  theory though, 
both in terms of  general frameworks like mating systems theory 
(for example Emlen and Oring 1977; Davies 1991; Reynolds 1996; 
Shuster and Wade 2003; Shuker 2010; Kokko et al. 2014) and in 
terms of  specific optimality models predicting sexually selected 
traits, such as copulation duration in dung flies (for example Parker 
1970a; Parker and Simmons 1994) or time of  emergence (prot-
andry) in butterflies (for example Wiklund and Fagerström 1977; 
Bulmer 1983; Iwasa et  al. 1983; Morbey and Ydenberg 2001; 
Morbey et al. 2012). Here, the analogy with the rest of  natural se-
lection theory is clear. For instance, we have a wonderful body of  
evolutionary theory used to predict and explain many of  the traits 
we see, such as sex allocation theory (West 2009), but we do not in-
clude those specifics in our definition of  natural selection.
Finally, we suggest that a definition should be agnostic about 
the number of  mates individuals have, and indeed the nature 
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and extent of  variation in the number of  mates or resulting fer-
tilizations that individuals within a sex exhibit. A  straightfor-
ward reason for this is that sexual selection can still occur in 
fully monogamous species (Kirkpatrick et  al. 1990; Andersson 
1994; Dougherty et  al. 2016; Kvarnemo 2018), for example, if  
the adult sex ratio is biased (generating strong mating competi-
tion within the sex in excess; for example Price 1984; Kvarnemo 
et al. 2007; Fromhage and Jennions 2016), or through assortative 
pair-formation, often driven by mutual mate choice (for example 
Parker 1983; Johnstone et al. 1996; Jones and Ratterman 2009). 
We will consider variation in the number of  mates in more detail 
below when we address definitions of  sexual selection based on 
the variance in mating success.
A DEFINITION OF SEXUAL SELECTION
After what we see as a continuity from the words and works of  
Darwin, as captured by Andersson (1994) and Shuker (2010, 2014), 
we define sexual selection as follows:
Sexual selection is any selection that arises from fitness differences associated 
with nonrandom success in the competition for access to gametes for fertilization.
Fertilization  is important, hence, by “access to gametes” (as 
used  as shorthand below) we emphasize that the route to fitness 
through competition for access to gametes requires fertilization as 
the outcome. For completeness, we assume that gametes are viable 
and able to take part in fertilization; this primary function of  male 
and female gametes will be under natural selection. As such, a trait 
is under sexual selection when variation in that trait is nonrandomly 
associated with variation in access to gametes, when those gametes 
form a limiting resource. Evolution by sexual selection follows when 
there is a heritable component to the trait under sexual selection.
Indeed, in more genetical terms, the extent to which a given 
allele is under sexual selection is the extent to which there is a 
marginal change in allele frequency associated with nonrandom access 
to gametes for fertilization. Sexual selection is therefore one way 
of  partitioning allele frequency change – that is into natural and 
sexual selection components of  fitness – in an analogous way to 
partitioning allele frequency change into direct and indirect com-
ponents of  fitness in an inclusive fitness framework (for example 
Gardner et  al. 2011). Henceforth we will assume additive genetic 
variation in relevant traits, to make the discussion more concise.
From the outset, we do not wish to suggest that our definition is 
new; indeed, our definition is very close to definitions of  sexual se-
lection given before (see, for instance, Kokko et al. 2006). We hope 
to make this abundantly clear when we review other definitions 
below. However, we consider that there are problems with alterna-
tive definitions of  sexual selection and that the underlying logic of  
sexual selection is not always fully appreciated.
As such, several important points emerge from this definition. 
First, competition is for access to gametes. We recognize that access 
to mates is a typical first step towards obtaining access to gametes 
(in particular in internal fertilizers), and that we indeed expect two 
broad classes of  sexual selection fitness components: those associ-
ated with precopulatory mating success (for example Bateson 1983; 
Hardy and Briffa 2013) and those associated with post-copulatory 
fertilization success (for example Parker 1970b; Smith 1984; 
Eberhard 1996; Birkhead and Møller 1998; Simmons 2001). As 
discussed by Birkhead (2010), it was this second component that 
was elusive to Darwin. However, the traditional focus on access to 
mates as the keystone to sexual selection is perhaps because hu-
mans are not broadcast spawners. We will return to the case when 
competition for mates may not yield sexual selection below.
Importantly, gametes as a resource can vary in two ways, and thus 
be limiting in two ways. They can vary in quantity, and they can vary 
in quality. Competition can therefore arise for access to gametes in 
terms of  getting access to the most gametes, but also in terms of  
access to gametes of  the highest quality. We will revisit the impor-
tance of  competition in terms of  quality below (as this is one of  the 
areas where things can get hairy).
Second, we are agnostic as to the sexual identity of  the competi-
tors (it could be males, females, hermaphrodites, or individuals of  
mating type A or mating type B). This means that we are also ag-
nostic as to whether or not sexual selection happens in both sexes/
mating types at the same time; all options are possible. However, 
implicit in our definition is that individuals of  the same sex, same 
mating type, or tissues with the same sexual function (for example 
male function in hermaphrodites), compete for the gametes of  the op-
posite sex or complementary mating type. In other words, sexual se-
lection arises from competition within a sex or mating type.
Whilst this again might seem straightforward, confusion can 
arise when sexual selection is influenced by interactions between 
the sexes. Such interactions certainly influence fertilization success, 
through mate choice (when one sex competes to be chosen by the 
other sex). But care is needed in noting which sex is competing for 
whose gametes.
The definition of  mate choice has itself  been recently reassessed 
(Edward 2014). We consider mate choice to arise from the nonrandom 
patterns of  mating, and subsequent fertilization success, in the chosen 
Table 1
Mechanisms of  Competition Over Mates and Gametes, Based on and Developed from Table 1.1.1 in Andersson (1994)
Mechanisms Favoured traits in competing sex
Scramble competition sensory and locomotory organs to quickly locate mates (for example hearing, olfaction)
Endurance rivalry ability to endure prolonged reproductive activity (for example condition, lifespan)
Contest competition ability to outcompete rivals before mating through direct combat (for example body size, weapons), or ability to 
avoid such competition through alternative reproductive tactics
Mate choice competition to be chosen through behavioral or morphological traits that the opposite sex finds attractive (for 
example ornaments, indicators of  ‘good’ or compatible genes), or resources that the other sex needs (for example 
territory, nuptial gift, parental care), or ability to circumvent mate choice (for example forced copulations)
Gamete competition after mating ability to outcompete rivals through gamete competition after mating (for example large numbers of  sperm, large 
size of  eggs), or ability to avoid that gamete competition (for example mate guarding, mating plugs)
Cryptic mate choice competition to be chosen after mating through traits that the opposite sex prefers (for example ‘good’ or compatible 
genes)
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sex due to one or more phenotypic traits in the choosy sex. These phe-
notypic traits may be behavioral (and approach what we might think 
of  as a more active “choice”) or be morphological or physiological; 
what is important is that the chooser biases mating and/or fertilization 
as a result. Crucially, whilst there must be nonrandom success with re-
spect to some aspect of  the phenotype of  the chosen sex for choice to 
occur, there need not be any variation amongst choosers (that is they 
may all choose the same individual or individuals). Mate choice thus 
mediates a form of  within-sex competition for access to gametes, but 
it does not replace it.
Our definition is sex neutral, but it does identify what is being 
competed for (gametes for fertilization), albeit in general terms. 
Whilst we highlight competition for mates and gametes as two 
major classes of  sexual selection fitness components, we have 
not identified specific mechanisms by which sexually selected fit-
ness may be obtained. This also means that we have not specified 
whether or not sexual selection aligns with other components of  fit-
ness. As such, our definition is not contingent on the action of  any 
other forms of  selection. That said, we expect that sexual selection 
will comprise only some of  the variation in fitness in a given popu-
lation at a given time.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURAL 
SELECTION AND SEXUAL SELECTION
By being agnostic to other components of  fitness, where does our 
definition place sexual selection with regards to natural selection? 
The relationship between natural and sexual selection has been long 
debated, from Darwin onwards (for example Darwin 1871; Fisher 
1930; Arnold 1983; Andersson 1994; Klug et al. 2010; Alonzo and 
Servedio 2019). As mentioned above, a particularly useful con-
ceptualization was provided by Endler (1986). He suggested that 
broad-sense natural selection should be taken to comprise all pos-
sible components of  fitness (a sort of  complete compendium of  
Darwinian selection possibilities), whilst narrow-sense natural selection 
should be taken to comprise things like viability and fecundity selec-
tion, as these have been more traditionally considered to be “natural 
selection,” and the main focus of  Darwin’s The Origin of  Species.
When theorists have considered natural selection acting to op-
pose sexual selection during the development of  a sexual ornament, 
it is usually in terms of  something like viability selection (as an or-
nament gets bigger, so natural selection via predation acts to limit 
further exaggeration, for example). If  we take Endler’s view, then 
sexual selection sits within broad-sense evolution by natural selec-
tion but is separate from narrow-sense natural selection. However, 
there is not necessarily a “correct” answer here: we give things 
names as and when it is useful to do so. We should remember that 
although partitioning up fitness into different components may be 
useful, there will be alternative ways to partition fitness. Our def-
inition clarifies a partitioning of  fitness that goes back to Darwin. 
We should also remember that partitioning fitness in theory is 
more straightforward than doing so in practice. We should not be 
surprised when the empirical utility of  partitioning out fitness is 
compromised, as when fitness components align and become in-
distinguishable. This would happen if  access to mates correlated 
perfectly with feeding ability or longevity, for example. Indeed, we 
should expect such alignments to occur in real mating systems in 
real ecologies. However, we should not take those failures too seri-
ously either, as concepts such as sexual selection and viability selec-
tion still have useful conceptual work to do (for further discussion, 
see Shuker 2010).
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS
Here we consider a number of  alternative definitions of  sexual se-
lection. In Table 2 we provide a flavor of  various definitions by a 
range of  authors, from Darwin onwards (for a similar sample, see 
Alonzo and Servedio 2019). Some of  those definitions overlap or 
restate our definition, and we do not consider those further. We 
appreciate that our survey is by no means comprehensive, but we 
nonetheless hope that we cover the major groups of  alternative def-
initions, minor differences in wording notwithstanding.
First, a definition of  sexual selection has been proposed that 
limits itself  to mate choice by females or otherwise (Roughgarden 
et  al. 2006). However, as pointed out above, such a definition of  
sexual selection is far too narrow, as it excludes intrasexual selection 
via both mating and sperm and egg competition. In particular, it 
neglects a very substantial body of  work that has traditionally sat 
within the compass of  sexual selection: that is intrasexual (such as 
male–male) contest competition for access to  gametes (Andersson 
1994; Hardy and Briffa 2013). This component of  sexual selection 
influences traits that are unlikely to have been favored by narrow-
sense natural selection, such as horns and antlers (Andersson 1994; 
Emlen 2008, 2014; see in particular the discussion in McCullough 
et  al. 2016). Focusing on mate choice, although ignoring the 
intrasexual competition, also lacks conceptual coherence, as it fo-
cuses on one group of  mechanisms that might influence or mediate 
within-sex mating competition, whilst not including others (a point 
made, albeit rather cryptically, by Fisher 1930, p. 131–132).
Second, sexual selection is sometimes defined in terms of  var-
iation in reproductive success (for example in textbooks such as 
Avassar et  al. 2013; Clark et  al. 2018). Whilst this is understand-
able in some ways, because mating and reproduction seem to go 
hand in hand, reproductive success is actually a much broader con-
cept, representing an organism’s direct fitness (in an inclusive fitness 
framework) through all direct fitness components, including those 
related to longevity, fecundity, and parental care. Informally, one 
has to survive to reproduce, as well as find mates, so reproductive 
success per se is too broad a concept to separate out sexual selec-
tion from other aspects of  narrow-sense natural selection; all direct 
fitness collapses into reproductive success. Unfortunately, perhaps 
the most-repeated of  Darwin’s definitions of  sexual selection car-
ries with it the sense of  “reproductive success,” stating as it does 
that sexual selection “depends on the advantage which certain individuals 
have over other individuals of  the same sex and species, in exclusive relation to 
reproduction” (Darwin 1871, p. 256; Table 2).
Taken at face value, this definition seems to focus on repro-
duction, rather than competition for mates (and then gametes). 
However, Darwin, in the preceding pages, discussed the differ-
ence between primary and secondary characters, noting that pri-
mary characters – which are needed to reproduce at all – are not 
the target of  sexual selection, but secondary sexual characters are. 
Darwin also noted that it is “scarcely possible to decide” how to identify 
primary versus secondary sexual characters or separate out the ef-
fects of  natural or sexual selection. So, the difficulties in ascribing 
forms of  selection to traits were appreciated from the very outset of  
the intellectual history of  sexual selection (Darwin 1871, p. 254; see 
also Fisher 1930, p. 132).
The relationship between reproductive success and sexual se-
lection has been brought into renewed focus in recent years 
through a number of  papers that have sought to redraw, or at least 
reexamine, ways in which sexual selection may influence females 
(Clutton-Brock 2007, 2009, 2010, 2017; Rosvall 2011; Stockley and 
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Table 2
Examples of  Definitions of  Sexual Selection from Darwin Onwards
Darwin 1859, p. 88: “Sexual selection […] depends, not on a struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males for possession of  the females; the result is not 
death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring.”
Darwin 1871, p. 256: “We are, however, here concerned only with that kind of  selection, which I have called sexual selection. This depends on the advantage which 
certain individuals have over other individuals of  the same sex and species, in exclusive relation to reproduction.”
Huxley 1938, p. 416: “Darwin’s theory of  sexual selection was of  the compound deductive-inductive type. Deductively he postulated: (1) that under certain 
circumstances there would occur a struggle between males for mates, and that the characters giving success in such a struggle would have sexually-selective value and 
would be perpetuated irrespective of  their natural-selective value in the general struggle for existence; (2) that these characters would be of  two main types, (a) those 
subserving male display, (b) those subserving combat between rival males, and that such characters could not be evolved except under the operation of  sexual selection 
as defined by him. With regard to display characters, he further deduced a rudimentary esthetic sense in females, and also a process of  female choice as between rival 
males.”
Ehrman 1972 (Chapter 6 in Campbell), p. 106: “At present it seems best to simply define sexual selection as all mechanisms which cause deviations from panmixia.”
Crook 1972 (Chapter 9 in Campbell), p. 264: Social selection “is primarily in relation to direct competition.”… “Social selection results from (a) effects of  competition 
between the subject and others of  either sex with respect of  commodities essential to survival in a situation that will allow an attempt at reproduction, (b) competition for 
access to preferred members of  the opposite sex for mating and (c) effects of  competition between subjects for access to commodities in the environment essential for the 
rearing of  their young to reproductive age. Of  these b is the process most commonly referred to as sexual selection.” [In other words, sexual selection becomes a subset 
under social selection, but because social selection only relates to direct competition, sexual selection due to scramble or endurance competition is not included].
Maynard Smith 1978 (Chapter 10 Sexual selection, in The Evolution of  Sex), p. 168: “As soon as aniosogamy has evolved, different selective forces may act on males 
and females; it is these differential forces with which I am concerned in this chapter.” [This can thus be read as if  Maynard Smith defines sexual selection as selection 
acting differently on the two sexes].
West-Eberhard 1979, p222 and subsequently: West-Eberhard follows Darwin in viewing sexual selection as competition for mates, but also considers sexual selection 
a subset of  social selection, with the latter characterized by competition within a social group for one or more resources (which might include mates). For example: “I 
agree with Mayr (1972, p.88) that “something rather important was lost” in the process of  redefining fitness and erasing Darwin’s distinction between these two kinds of  
selection [natural and sexual selection] — just as something is lost by stretching the concept of  sexual selection to make it suit new purposes which, however interesting 
in their own right, tend to obscure what Darwin was trying to say (for example, Ehrman’s1972, p.106, redefinition of  sexual selection as “all mechanisms which cause 
deviations from panmixia,” or Maynard Smith’s, 1978, inclusion of  all selection acting differently on the two sexes). When Darwin wrote about sexual selection he 
focused primarily on social competition for mates.”
Partridge and Halliday 1984 (Chapter 9 in Krebs & Davies, 2nd edition), p. 222: “It has long been obvious that the gametes produced in natural populations do not 
pair up at random. Leaving aside the obvious restrictions imposed by species and gender, some individuals may obtain more fertilizations than others, and particular 
types of  parings may be more common than others. Such nonrandom mating is of  fundamental evolutionary importance because different matings may have different 
fitness consequences.” Continued on p. 225: “As Darwin was first to recognize, variance in the number of  successful matings is the raw material for sexual selection, 
defined as selection on characters giving certain individuals an advantage over others of  the same sex in obtaining successful matings.”
Andersson 1994, p. 3: “According to Darwin (1871), sexual selection arises from differences in reproductive success caused by competition over mates.” Continued on 
p. 8: “Sexual selection of  a trait can therefore be viewed as a shorthand phrase for differences in reproductive success, caused by competition over mates, and related to 
the expression of  the traits”; and p. 9: “In spite of  many suggestions to the contrary by leading biologists […] the term sexual selection in here restricted to competition 
over mates.”
Roughgarden et al. 2006, p. 965: “Since 1871, sexual selection theory has often been restated (4), yet contemporary definitions share Darwin’s central narrative: 
“We now understand… Males, who can produce many offspring with only minimal investment, spread their genes most effectively by mating promiscuously. Female 
reproductive output is far more constrained by the metabolic costs of  producing eggs or offspring, and thus a female’s interests are served more by mate quality than by 
mate quantity” (5). … The reproductive social behavior of  most species has not been studied, but a great many of  those that have been do not conform to Darwinian 
sexual-selection templates. We suggest that sexual selection is always mistaken, even where gender roles superficially match the Darwinian templates.”
Kokko et al. 2006, p. 44: “Sexual selection: selection generated by differential access to opposite-sex gametes (or mates).” [This definition is by far the closest to our 
definition].
Ritchie 2007, p. 80: “Sexual selection: the component of  natural selection arising owing to variation in mating or fertilization success”
Carranza 2009, p. 750: “In 1994, […] I proposed a definition for sexual selection as (page 380; translated from Spanish): ‘those natural selection forces that operate 
differently in males and females because of  the strategies of  the sexes’. This is simply to adopt the concept of  sex-dependent selection as a modern use of  the term 
sexual selection to investigate the evolution of  differences between the sexes.”
Clutton-Brock 2009, p. 8: Contrasts in the operation of  sexual selection in the two sexes raise the question of  whether adaptations to intrasexual competition in 
females should be regarded as products of  sexual selection or natural selection. In The Descent of  Man Darwin sometimes described ‘sexual’ selection as selection 
operating through intrasexual competition to reproduce […] and sometimes as selection operating through competition for mates, although the term is now most 
commonly restricted to selection operating through intrasexual competition for mating opportunities (Andersson 1994). Because females more commonly need to 
compete for breeding opportunities than mating opportunities, defining sexual selection in terms of  competition for mates has the effect of  restricting its operation to 
males, creating unfortunate dichotomies where functionally similar traits are attributed to sexual selection if  they occur in males but to natural selection if  they occur in 
females. […] The most satisfactory solution might be to abandon the distinction between sexual and natural selection altogether and emphasize, instead, the contrasting 
ways in which selection operates in males and females (Clutton-Brock 2007). However, the distinction between sexual and natural selection is so heavily entrenched 
that this is unlikely to occur and the most feasible alternative is probably to broaden the concept of  sexual selection to include all selection processes operating through 
intrasexual competition for breeding opportunities in either sex (Clutton-Brock 2007).”
Jones and Ratterman 2009: “Darwin makes it clear that not all selection related to reproduction constitutes sexual selection, as primary sexual traits—like ovaries 
and testes—can evolve as a consequence of  natural selection. Even though he never spells it out in so many words, Darwin’s working definition of  sexual selection is 
essentially identical to the one used by Andersson [1994] and most other scientists studying sexual selection. In particular, ‘‘sexual selection arises from differences in 
reproductive success caused by competition for access to mates’’ [Andersson 1994, p 3]. This definition admittedly focuses primarily on precopulatory sexual selection, 
so a more complete definition should also include postcopulatory processes, which can be accomplished by tagging the phrase ‘‘or fertilization opportunities’’ onto the 
end of  Andersson’s definition.”
Kuijper et al. 2012: “Sexual selection is the process by which individuals compete for access to mates and fertilization opportunities.”
Safran et al. 2013, p. 644: …”we define sexual selection as the result of  the differential reproductive success that arises from competition for mates and access to 
fertilizations.”
Rosenthal 2017, p. 503: “Sexual selection. A special case of  natural selection: differential reproductive success due to the ability to secure matings and/or fertilization.”
Alonzo and Servedio 2019, Table 1: Their table offers a similar sample of  definitions of  sexual selection, which (together with our examples above) highlights the 
challenge for the field of  sexual selection.
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Bro-Jørgensen 2011; Tobias et al. 2012). From a series of  observa-
tions of  – mostly – vertebrates, the idea that individuals of  a given 
sex compete between themselves for resources, or social status, cru-
cial for reproduction has been suggested to be a form of  sexual 
selection, with the idea that “reproductive competition” comes to 
replace or broaden the notion of  “competition for mates.” The 
problem with bringing female-female competition for reproduc-
tive resources, or indeed male–male competition for such resources, 
into sexual selection is that much of  what all organisms do – male 
or female – is to compete for resources that sooner or later con-
tribute to variation in reproductive success. In the broadest terms, 
this means that natural and sexual selection perfectly coincide, and 
the latter term becomes meaningless (Clutton-Brock 2007, 2009; 
Shuker 2010). If  we wished to be less broad, then we would have 
to decide, a priori, how “close” to reproduction the resource was, 
or the competition for it was, when saying whether or not that 
competition engenders natural or sexual selection. Given that re-
source acquisition, and the life-history decisions that underlie how 
resources are allocated and competed for, may play out over the 
long-term (for example early-life effects: Lindström 1999; Jonsson 
and Jonsson 2011), teasing resource competition apart to assign to 
sexual or natural selection would be challenging. Instead, we sug-
gest that components of  “natural selection” are about being able 
to enter and remain in the fertilization game, where competition for 
access to mates and their gametes occurs, and that “sexual selec-
tion” is about how well you succeed in that game when compared 
with other same-sex contestants. Whilst fully recognizing the im-
pact sexual selection has on the fitness of  both sexes, we consider 
that competition for access to gametes is the focus of  sexual selection, and 
that competition for resources – whether directly required for re-
production or not – is the focus of  other components of  fitness, 
unless the resource itself  influences access to gametes. We will return 
to this topic below.
Another definition of  sexual selection is again drawn from a par-
ticular reading of  Darwin. Authors such as Padian and Horner 
have argued that sexual selection is characterized by sexual di-
morphism of  secondary sexual traits (Padian and Horner 2011a, 
2011b, 2014a, 2014b; but see Knell et  al. 2013; Borkovic and 
Russell 2014; Clutton-Brock 2017 also discusses the links between 
sexual dimorphism and sexual selection). Basing this idea on the 
detailed discussions of  dimorphism given by Darwin, sexual selec-
tion is then defined either as the driver of  sexual dimorphism, or 
only as occurring when there is sexual dimorphism (for example 
Padian and Horner 2014b). Put another way, without sexual dimor-
phism, sexual selection cannot act (or be said to have acted). This 
view of  sexual selection, which we reject, has been discussed in par-
ticular in the paleontological literature, where evidence for sexual 
selection is notoriously difficult to find (for example Knell et  al. 
2013; Mallon 2017; Hone and Mallon 2017; O’Brien et al. 2018). 
However, that search is made harder still by stipulating a priori that 
fossils need to exhibit sexual dimorphism before sexual selection as 
a mechanism can come into play. Whilst there is much that could 
be discussed here, we will simply make the following points. First, 
there is clear evidence that sexual dimorphism can arise through 
narrow-sense natural selection on the sexes favoring ecological 
displacement (Shine 1989; Fairbairn et  al. 2007). Second, the re-
quirement for sexual dimorphism would mean that sexual selection 
cannot occur in isogamous species with separate mating types, or 
indeed in simultaneous hermaphrodites. Third, there is clear evi-
dence of  sexual selection in species that are sexually monomorphic, 
such as mutual mate choice for head ornaments in crested auklets 
(Jones and Hunter 1993). All in all, the requirement for sexual di-
morphism for sexual selection to be said to be occurring is overly 
restrictive and lacks logical coherence when considering the compe-
tition for gametes in monomorphic species.
Along similar lines, but not so closely tied to sexual dimorphism 
per se, another alternative definition focuses on the different pat-
terns of  selection that arise on the two sexes (Carranza 2009), 
taking its cue from the title of  Darwin’s book (1871: “selection in 
relation to sex”). As noted above, we should be careful in reading 
too much into the title of  that book, and indeed the phraseology 
Darwin used at times, given the social circumstances under which 
he was writing, and the pressures applied by his publisher (Dawson 
2007). Nonetheless, it is still not clear that viewing sexual selection 
in terms of  differential patterns of  selection on males and females 
is useful. Carranza (2009) argued for a definition of  sexual selec-
tion based on the differences between the sexes in the action of  
selection. We think that this definition is a long way from Darwin’s 
conception of  sexual selection and sits more neatly alongside the 
current body of  sexual conflict theory (Parker 1979; Arnqvist and 
Rowe 2005). As a definition of  sexual selection – at least as usually 
envisaged – it is problematic as the sexes may experience different 
patterns of  selection on traits unrelated to reproduction (that is ec-
ological causes of  sexual dimorphism, as discussed above: Shine 
1989). The corollary of  this, as Carranza himself  suggests, is that 
once we have separate sexual functions, then nearly all selection 
may be sexual selection. As such, sexual selection swallows natural 
selection (much as we saw natural selection swallowing sexual selec-
tion above). Therefore, whilst sexual selection may contribute to the 
opposing patterns of  selection that arise on males and females (that 
is, sexual conflict), sexual conflict is most decidedly not the same 
thing as sexual selection (Shuker 2010; Kokko et al. 2014).
The final alternative definition of  sexual selection we wish to 
consider explicitly is of  a somewhat different nature: defining 
sexual selection in terms of  one way in which it may be measured 
(Shuster and Wade 2003; see suggestion in Roughgarden et  al. 
2015). Shuster and Wade (2003; henceforth S&W) summarized a 
research programme initiated by Wade and coworkers that sought 
to quantify the differences between males and females in the vari-
ance in the number of  mates each sex obtained (Wade 1979; Wade 
and Arnold 1980; Wade 1995). More formally, after Crow (1958, 
1962), they show that the difference between males and females in 
the total opportunity of  selection (Imales - Ifemales) is equal to what is 
termed Imates, where I represents the opportunity for selection. S&W 
state that Imates gives a “standardized measure of  the intensity of  sexual se-
lection on males and the sex difference in strength of  selection” (Shuster and 
Wade 2003, p. 29). Importantly, as the authors also note, the oppor-
tunity for selection is just that, only the opportunity. As such, Imates 
offers only an upper limit on selection.
The Imates approach has been the subject of  a number of  cri-
tiques and rebuttals down the years (for example Sutherland 1985; 
Downhower et al. 1987; Shuster and Wade 2003; Klug et al. 2010; 
Krakauer et al. 2011; Jennions et al. 2012; Henshaw et al. 2016). 
We do not wish to rehearse that debate here. Rather we wish to 
argue against the use of  this measure as a definition of  sexual se-
lection. First, it is true that one cannot measure what one cannot 
define. But to define something by its measurement is a different 
thing entirely, risking circularity and reification. Second, and more 
problematic, is that the opportunity for sexual selection may also 
include random processes that influence the variance in obtaining 
gametes within a sex, so it may be nonzero even in the absence of  
any form of  selection.
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THE ROLE OF FEMALES IN SEXUAL SELECTION
Before we challenge our definition in the face of  some real-world 
complications, we need to address the recent literature that has 
attempted to redraw the scope of  sexual selection that we have 
outlined above, in particular in terms of  accommodating female 
“reproductive competition” within a framework of  sexual selection. 
Clearly females can and do compete for male gametes, but as noted 
above females also compete for other resources required for repro-
duction, and it is “reproductive competition” in this context that 
authors such as Clutton-Brock (see above) have suggested should be 
included with sexual selection. The argument is that by neglecting 
this kind of  female–female competition, we are missing something 
important about sexual selection. We disagree and here we extend 
our argument introduced above.
First, our definition is explicitly sex and sex-role neutral: there is 
nothing in our definition that precludes females, or indeed herm-
aphrodites, or isogamous species, from the action of  sexual selec-
tion. A  recent example of  females competing for access to male 
gametes comes from the common glowworm, Lampyris noctiluca 
(Hopkins et al. 2015; Borshagovski et al. 2019; Figure 1a–c). In this 
species, the female attracts a male by glowing. There is no resource 
other than sperm that successful females gain, and far from all fe-
males manage to attract a male. Thus, clearly female ability to at-
tract males by their glow is a sexually selected trait.
Second, we do not consider that there is anything particularly 
special, intrinsically better, or more interesting, about sexual se-
lection compared with other forms of  selection. As such, we see 
no detriment –  theoretically or empirically – in whether certain 
forms of  competition are or are not included within the scope of  
sexual selection. What is more important is a coherent and ro-
bust definition of  sexual selection and the resulting body of  work. 
For instance, that female Goniozus wasps fight over access to hosts, 
and that this competition determines their ability to reproduce 
(Goubault et al. 2006, 2007; Figure 1d–e) resulting in narrow-sense 
natural selection, is just as fascinating as male red deer competing 
over access to a harem of  females (Clutton-Brock et al. 1982) re-
sulting in sexual selection. All organisms compete for the opportu-
nity to reproduce, throughout their development, competing for 
the necessary food and other resources prior to reproductive ma-
turity, fighting off parasites and predators, and so on. For female 
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Female competition for (a–c) gametes in the common glow worm, and (d–e) resources required for reproduction in the parasitoid wasp Goniozus legneri. (a) 
A female Lampyris noctiluca glowing to attract mates (photo: Jouni Valkeeniemi). (b) Experimental evidence that male L. noctiluca are attracted to brighter green 
LED lights, used here to mimic female displays (High brightness and Low brightness are 12.6 × 1012 and 7.0 × 1011 photons cm−2 s−1 respectively), whilst 
females with larger lanterns are also more fecund (c). (d) Female G. legneri fight for possession of  a host on which to lay eggs, which can lead to vigorous 
struggles (inset; photos: Sonia Dourlot). (e) These contests are determined by differences in aggression between the owner and intruder, with the more 
aggressive individual, that initiates more interactions, winning the resource. The fitted line is from a logistic regression. (b-c) Figures redrawn from Open 
Access Data provided by Hopkins et al. (2015) under a CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication license. (d–e) Figures reproduced from Goubault et al. 
(2006) with permission of  The Royal Society.
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Goniozus wasps (Figure 1d), the final arena of  reproductive competi-
tion shares much in common with contest competition over access 
to gametes, but what is being competed over is different: it is not 
gametes, but rather the resources needed for offspring to develop, 
in their case lepidopteran larvae. In this regard, the resulting se-
lection is akin to selection on mammals to supply young with food 
and protection, the selection that we usually ascribe to narrow-
sense natural selection. Apparent similarities (for example, in terms 
of  contests) should not get in the way of  the underlying logic of  
what is being competed for and why. As a hypothetical test (sim-
ilar to the logic of  potential reproductive rates: Clutton-Brock and 
Parker 1992), we may consider what would happen if  an individual 
were given access to an extra set of  gametes, what would happen 
to their fitness? In the red deer case, it would clearly increase male 
fitness, whereas in the female wasp case it would not, as the latter 
are limited by hosts, not gametes.
Another example is reproductive dominance. Reproductive dom-
inance can achieve two aims. First, it can prevent other same-sex in-
dividuals from producing gametes at all. Well-known examples are 
found in animals that live in close-knit communities. For example, 
in ants and meerkats, dominant females may prevent other females 
in the colony from developing eggs or evict subdominants (for ex-
ample Bourke and Franks 1995; Young et al. 2006; Clutton-Brock 
et al. 2008). In these instances, reproductive dominance is primarily 
about policing the opportunity to reproduce, limiting competition for the 
resources that offspring need, and so maximize relative fecundity of  
the dominant females. It is not about access to opposite-sex gam-
etes, as subordinates have been precluded from even entering into 
that competition. Our conclusion, therefore, is that it falls under 
narrow-sense natural selection, and reproductive competition is a 
useful label to describe it (for example Clutton-Brock 2017).
Second, reproductive dominance can prevent other reproductively 
competent individuals in the group from mating and competing for 
fertilisation. In chimpanzees, all mature males are sexually com-
petent, and indeed may attempt to copulate with a female on 
“consortships” away from the group, but the dominant alpha male 
will otherwise police the sexual behavior of  subordinate males. 
Here, the reproductive dominance is sexually selected, as the dom-
inant male is preventing subordinates from accessing opposite-sex 
gametes, subordinates who are otherwise able to inseminate fe-
males. Therefore, to repeat the hypothetical experiment, if  a sub-
dominant meerkat female is given (secretly) free access to male 
gametes, then it presumably will not improve her fitness, as she 
does not have sufficient status in the group to reproduce, regardless 
of  access to gametes, whereas a free mating for a chimpanzee male 
is free fitness.
Similarly, in harem-holding sequential hermaphrodites, such as 
many wrasses, the largest and most dominant individual in a shoal 
becomes a male, whereas all the subdominant individuals repro-
duce as females. Here, all individuals are able to reproduce, but by 
being dominant, the male function gets exclusive access to the gam-
etes of  the other sex (hence sexual selection). Here the competition 
for access to gametes becomes tied up with which is the optimal sex 
to be if  dominant.
We do not pretend that the dividing line will necessarily be easy 
to draw in real organisms in all cases. In the pipefish Syngnathus 
typhle, males provide care by carrying the embryos in a brood 
pouch on the tail. In this species, the hypothetical experiment 
above has already been carried out, and it shows that females ben-
efit more from free access to the opposite sex and its gametes than 
males do, and that, on average, female egg production is almost 
twice as high as the male capacity to care for the eggs (Berglund 
et  al. 1989), creating female-female competition for mating op-
portunities with males (Rosenqvist and Berglund 2011). Fish typ-
ically grow throughout their life and this species is no exception. 
Experimental work shows that small (young) females with free ac-
cess to males reduce egg production and instead invest more in 
growth in the presence of  an enclosed but visible large female, 
compared with when kept in the visual presence of  a small female, 
or in the absence of  other females (Berglund 1991). Arguably, this 
is a result of  intrasexual dominance by the large female, combined 
with a male preference for larger females that produce more and 
larger eggs, favoring a life-history decision by the small female to 
allocate her resources to increasing her odds at gaining mating 
success later in life. We view this as an example of  female-female 
competition for mates, in which success is achieved, not through 
combat, but through reproductive dominance and competition in 
attractiveness. Nevertheless, because males provide both gametes 
and care, females compete for both gametes to fertilize her eggs 
(sexual selection) and for male care (natural selection; male care 
increases the growth and survival of  the female’s offspring: Nygård 
et al. 2019).
We reiterate that we are in no way seeking to exclude females 
from sexual selection, nor to give males special status in terms of  
the action of  sexual selection. Indeed, after Eberhard (1996), we 
agree that females may still remain under-appreciated in terms of  
how females influence sexual selection on males, and in turn how 
sexual selection acts on females. For instance, the awareness that 
male mate choice (leading to sexual selection on females) is much 
more common than we used to think attests to this (Bonduriansky 
2001; Edward and Chapman 2011). However, that does not mean 
that female-female reproductive competition should necessarily 
be considered sexual selection by default. For us, what matters is 
what is being competed over. It is competition for fertilizations 
that yields sexual selection, and by making this distinction we can 
recognize shared or different routes to fitness for females and males 
(Figure 2).
CHALLENGING OUR DEFINITION
We wish to finish with four challenges to our definition of  sexual 
selection that we have not already explicitly considered. To do this, 
we will outline some other hypothetical empirical scenarios and 
identify what is and is not sexual selection under our definition, 
highlighting areas of  tension in interpretation that may arise. We 
appreciate that there are other scenarios, such as infanticide, that 
we do not treat here. For each of  these scenarios, we assume rel-
evant genetic variation underlying the traits of  interest, so for our 
purposes here selection equates with evolution by natural and/
or sexual selection. Throughout, it is key to identify what is being 
competed for, and by whom. Figure 2 provides a guide to help 
identify different “routes to fitness.” Crucially, a gamete producer 
can be both the target of  competition for the other sex, and also a 
competitor for the gametes of  the other sex.
Endurance rivalry
Endurance rivalry describes competition for gametes when the 
amount of  time invested in gaining fertilizations is how fitness is 
obtained (Thornhill and Alcock 1983; Andersson 1994). Endurance 
rivalry may play out over hours (for example in short-lived 
swarming insects), or over longer time periods (such as lek attend-
ance during a breeding season in species such as ruff), including 
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repeated breeding events across a lifetime. Given that it is often 
hard to follow individuals across their whole lifetime in the field, 
endurance rivalry – basically, living and mating for as long as you 
can – may be a rather common sexual selection fitness component. 
In such cases, longevity and mating success will be positively cor-
related, and the roles of  natural and sexual selection will be hard 
to separate. Put another way, longevity will be both sexually and 
naturally selected.
We could of  course consider that underlying both mating suc-
cess and longevity are a series of  allocation trade-offs, such that an 
organism that did not have to compete for mates would live longer 
(although we may also see positive correlations between these traits 
among individuals: van Noordwijk and de Jong 1986). If  access to 
mates or resources were manipulated experimentally, then we could 
estimate the proportion of  fitness due to natural or sexual selection 
fitness components, but it would not always be straightforward. As 
discussed above though, we do not consider this a grave problem. 
We should in fact expect any definition of  sexual selection to allow 
other fitness components to align and confound it. Traits will be 
under many possible forms of  natural and sexual selection, as many 
aspects of  an organism’s biology and ecology influence fitness (for 
example Evans and Garcia-Gonzalez 2016).
Mate choice: the chosen sex
Mate choice means, by definition, that there is nonrandom fertil-
ization success with respect to one or more phenotypes amongst 
members of  the chosen sex, and so there is sexual selection acting 
on that sex. All members of  the choosy sex may prefer the same few 
individuals, or indeed the same single individual, which will dictate 
how strong sexual selection on the chosen sex is. Alternatively, the 
choosy sex may differ amongst themselves in their preferences. This 
could of  course lead to complex patterns of  sexually selected fitness 
amongst the chosen sex. Nonetheless, this situation still seems rela-
tively straightforward.
However, what happens if  we focus on what is being chosen and 
what the routes to fitness are (Figure 2)? Under our definition the 
sexes are interchangeable, but for simplicity, consider choosy fe-
males and chosen males. First, consider that males vary in terms 
of  a resource that they have – this might be a territory or an in-
vestment made in parental care. As before, this is quite simple, with 
males being chosen if  they hold a territory or provide parental 
care, and so territorial or parental care investment is under sexual 
selection in males. Males may also vary in terms of  the quality of  
their resource or their care, and again females may prefer to fer-
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FEMALE OR MALE GAMETE PRODUCER
Figure 2
Routes to fitness for female and male gamete producers. (a) Routes to fitness for your sex, and (b) routes to fitness for the opposite sex. The two sexes are 
completely interchangeable. In (a), individuals and their gametes of  the focal sex are the subject of  competition, and in (b) they are the object of  competition. 
As such, in (a) selection arises within the focal sex, and in (b) selection arises within the opposite sex, as a result of  gametic traits and other phenotypes in the 
focal sex. Both (a) and (b) will occur concurrently. Yellow lines denote routes to fitness via narrow-sense natural selection, blue lines denote routes to fitness via 
sexual selection, and green lines denotes routes where both natural and sexual selection may yet occur. Solid lines denote fitness routes influenced by gamete 
quality or quantity in the focal sex, and dotted lines denote fitness routes influenced by other traits.
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quality parental care. This would lead to males evolving to provide 
more care or hold larger territories than expected based only on 
naturally selected fitness components (Kvarnemo 2006), poten-
tially affecting male survival, offspring survival, as well male mating 
success. The overall result is the same though: sexual selection on 
males, with some doing better at getting fertilizations than others 
due to mate choice. This means that resources, and competition for 
those resources, can influence and be part of  sexual selection on 
males. However, it is only the extent to which providing those re-
sources influences a male’s access to gametes that is sexually selected.
Following on from this, if  choosy females start competing amongst 
themselves for the male that provides the most care or holds the 
best territory, these females are under natural selection, as long as 
the target of  the competition is access to the resource, and not to 
gametes. This means that the bushcricket Kawanaphila nartee, a classic 
example of  sexual selection on females, generated by female-female 
competition for mating opportunities early in the mating season 
when food availability (pollen) is limited (Gwynne and Simmons 
1990; Simmons and Bailey 1990), may need to be reevaluated: If  
females compete for males to gain access to their gametes, they are 
then under sexual selection, but as soon as females instead com-
pete for males to gain access to their nutritious spermatophylax, 
and not their gametes, this competition falls under natural selec-
tion in our proposed framework. That said, male ability to locate 
pollen needed to produce the spermatophylax, without which a 
male bushcricket cannot mate, would be a sexually selected trait in 
males when it leads to greater access to female gametes. A tangled 
bank indeed!
Crucially, what this means is that resources can have both pri-
mary and secondary sexual function, as with genitalia. An animal 
needs resources to survive and produce offspring in the first place, 
as they also need genitalia, but this is natural selection on primary 
sexual function, the selection that means an animal is able to en-
gage in competition for gametes. If  resources or genitalia then dif-
ferentially influence access to gametes, they gain secondary sexual 
function and come under sexual selection. And there is now abun-
dant evidence that sexual selection has driven divergence in animal 
genitalia, including in terms of  rapid evolutionary change, in both 
males and females (for example Eberhard 1996; Simmons 2014; 
Simmons and Fitzpatrick 2019; Sloan and Simmons 2019).
Next, we will consider the choosy sex, and how choice itself  
arises.
Mate choice: the choosy sex
Typically, the selection that causes a sex to become choosy in the 
first place is natural selection, i.e. there is a direct, natural selection 
fitness benefit to discriminating among potential partners (Fisher 
1930; Andersson 1994). However, how does sexual selection play 
out amongst the choosy sex once that sex has become choosy? 
Again, we will consider females as the choosy sex, but as before, the 
sexes are interchangeable. Under our definition, sexual selection 
acts on the choosy sex if  the behavioral, morphological or physio-
logical traits that generate choice mean that females differ nonran-
domly in their access to gametes. Mate choice is not always viewed 
in this competitive way among the choosers, and indeed it may not 
be competitive. For instance, one male may be super-attractive and 
also be able to inseminate fully all females in the population, and 
so all the females mate with him, their preferred male. Whilst there 
would be extremely strong sexual selection amongst males, given 
the extremely high reproductive skew, there would be no sexual 
selection amongst females, as there are no limiting resources in terms 
of  gametes to compete over.
On the other hand, male gametes may be limiting in terms of  
their quantity or quality, and so competition amongst the choosy 
sex will arise. That competition can manifest itself  as a form of  
– in this instance – female-female contest or scramble competition 
(depending on the mating system), or be influenced by patterns of  
male mate choice. Although rarely thought of  in this way, female 
ability to store sperm may also be sexually selected if  good storage 
allows the female prolonged access to a preferred male’s gametes.
We can imagine a variety of  outcomes, all of  which will be con-
tingent on aspects of  the mating system, which we will treat here 
with a broad brush. Females that have very wide acceptance thresh-
olds may be more likely to end up with a lower quality male than a 
stricter chooser, and so the latter will be favored by sexual selection 
if  they nonrandomly gain access to higher quality gametes. On the 
other hand, a stricter chooser may also miss-out on mating entirely, 
in which case the more permissive females will be favored. Thus, 
whether choosiness is favored or disfavored by sexual selection in 
the choosy sex will depend on how and why the chosen sex is a lim-
iting resource. Both mate availability and mate quality may act in 
concert in shaping the level and extent of  choosiness (Parker 1978, 
1983; Owens and Thompson 1994; Parker and Partridge 1998). 
Mating failure – the failure to mate and/or be inseminated – will 
therefore be selected against by sexual selection, as the focal indi-
vidual (of  whichever sex) has failed to gain sufficient access to gam-
etes to produce offspring (Garcia-Gonzalez 2004; Rhainds 2010; 
Greenway et al. 2015, 2017).
So far, we have considered choice in fairly simple terms, implic-
itly suggesting some sort of  “granting of  access” to allow a mating 
or transfer of  gametes to take place, or perhaps choosing one stored 
ejaculate over another, and using that to fertilize eggs. However, 
what if  choice is mediated by a change in resource allocation, such 
that the choosy sex invests more in the reproductive event because 
of  the identity of  the chosen partner (differential allocation: Burley 
1986, 1988; Sheldon 2000)?
The least problematic example would be if  a male releases more 
sperm with an attractive and/or high quality female, investing 
more in the given mating to protect and promote chances of  pa-
ternity with a high quality partner. This sort of  strategic sperm 
allocation commonly occurs (Simmons 2001; Wedell et  al. 2002; 
Parker and Pizzari 2010), and it could generate sexual selection in 
females as well (see above). The extent to which such male invest-
ment increases access to female gametes is the extent to which that 
investment is sexually selected in males. However, if  a female exerts 
choice by releasing more eggs (or by fertilizing more eggs than she 
would with another male), how do we interpret this? Under our 
view, by making more gametes available to the chosen male, what-
ever phenotype in the male is non-randomly associated with this 
choice by the female is therefore under sexual selection. In other 
words, that male phenotype has allowed him greater access to gam-
etes than another male would have gained. It does not matter that 
the number of  eggs that become available was only decided during 
or after the mating. Unsurprisingly, Eberhard (1996) includes just 
such a mechanism of  choice in his list of  possible mechanisms of  
cryptic female choice.
Differential allocation is perhaps more complicated from 
the female perspective though, as increasing the number of  
eggs (that is increasing fecundity) in response to a male trait of  
her liking is usually associated with narrow-sense natural selec-
tion, not sexual selection. For females in this case, our definition 
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suggests the following. The extent to which females increasing 
the numbers of  eggs produced with a given male means that 
they have greater access to male gametes as a limiting resource 
(either in terms of  quantity or quality of  males and their sperm) 
is the extent to which this behavior is sexually selected in females 
(Figure 2). In other words, if  females nonrandomly increase their 
immediate fecundity with respect to male phenotype (that is they 
exhibit choice), and by doing so they limit the access to preferred 
males for other females, then that behavior is sexually selected. 
Remember, sexual selection requires competition, and competi-
tion requires a limiting resource; if  females increasing their re-
productive allocation with a given male does not influence his 
availability to father offspring of  other females, then her alloca-
tion decisions are naturally selected and only about her fecundity 
under our definition. In summary, then, differential allocation 
can be a mechanism of  sexual selection in both sexes, and a way 
of  expressing mate choice, but only if  it leads to greater access 
to gametes of  the opposite sex.
Mate choice: the chooser and the chosen
Finally, imagine a species where both sexes choose mates and pro-
vide parental care. The overall reproductive success of  the pair 
depends on how much each individual is prepared to invest in gam-
etes, brood provisioning, and other forms of  care (Clutton-Brock 
1991; Royle et al. 2012). In species such as this, we would expect 
both sexes to be both chooser and chosen at the same time, al-
though in truth, mate choice by both sexes, regardless of  patterns 
of  parental care, may be more common than is often thought 
(for example Bonduriansky 2001; Edward and Chapman 2011; 
Rosenthal 2017). Generally, and ignoring complicating trade-offs, 
we would expect increased fecundity to be favored by natural selec-
tion, so diligent parents that worked well together and raised a large 
brood would be favored by natural selection to the extent that their 
investment led to greater direct fitness than that of  other pairs. Yet 
after our rationale, there is the scope here for sexual selection as 
well, if  the way in which resources and parental investment are al-
located influences whether or not one or both sexes do better in 
competition for gametes (Figure 2).
This competition could arise, for instance, if  there are repeated 
breeding attempts and/or the opportunity for extra pair offspring, 
whereby investment in reproduction nonrandomly influences access 
to gametes for a given individual. Investment in the breeding at-
tempt may then have three functions. First, it increases reproduc-
tive success (and so is under natural selection). Second, it increases 
access to gametes (as ever, in terms of  quality or quantity), either by 
encouraging the partner to make more gametes available, or by dis-
couraging the partner to make gametes available to others (and so 
is under sexual selection). Third, it may increase access to gametes 
by attracting other partners for extra pair fertilization (again under 
sexual selection). Only under strict monogamy, with no divorce, 
could we remove the possibility of  sexual selection on resource al-
location or parental investment during rearing, with only sexual se-
lection before pairing being possible.
There are analogies with the debate over the role of  nuptial gifts 
in species where males provide females with food or nutrients which 
are consumed by the female, during or after insemination (Gwynne 
1990; Wedell 1993; Simmons 1995; Vahed 1998; Lewis and South 
2012). In instances such as this, the investment a male makes in 
his nuptial gift may be considered as either (a) parental investment, 
as the energy and resources passed to the female help the female 
provision his future offspring (and so is under narrow-sense natural 
selection), or (b) sexually selected, as a bigger gift means the female 
makes more eggs available for his sperm to fertilize and/or allows 
more of  his sperm to enter into sperm competition to fertilize her 
eggs. Note that under our definition, the extent to which males vary 
in how their gifts cause females to “make more eggs available” is 
a source of  sexual selection in males, even if  in doing so a direct 
fecundity benefit also accrues to the females. Put another way, the 
natural selection fitness component we call “fecundity selection” 
only pertains to females – females have fecundity, males have access 
to gametes. Yes, males can run out of  sperm, but that is fertility, 
not fecundity. The nuptial gift literature has not always made this 
distinction clear though, associating the increased access of  male 
sperm to females able to produce more eggs as a result of  nuptial 
gifts with natural selection, rather than sexual selection.
In truth, nuptial gifts may well serve both parental investment 
and sexual selection functions, as data from the bushcricket Requena 
verticalis suggest for example (Simmons et al. 1993), and only with 
very careful experimentation and manipulation could one be able 
to identify the extent to which a nuptial gift brings fitness to males 
via one route or another. Without such experiments, arguments 
over the function of  nuptial gifts may be unproductive. Worse still, 
the two functions may also not be fully independent: greater pa-
rental investment may also select for greater investment in sperm 
competition mechanisms to protect that parental investment (Lewis 
and South 2012).
Finally, in Arnold and Wade’s influential paper (1984, their 
Figure 1), the process resulting in large males mating with a large 
number of  females is labelled sexual selection, but when larger 
males were better able to mate with more fecund females, it is 
called it natural selection. Under our definition, however, both 
cases are examples of  sexual selection on males.
Importantly, as we have stressed repeatedly above, we do not 
pretend that it will be empirically simple to disentangle the con-
tribution of  natural and sexual selection (and it may not even be 
interesting to do so), but this is where the logic takes us. We admit 
that in the process of  writing this paper we have had to “sacrifice” 
some of  our own favorite examples of  sexual selection. Having to 
give them up meant that we only reluctantly went where the logic 
took us.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a definition of  sexual selection and sought to 
put that definition into context. It is not a new definition, being 
strongly grounded in Darwin’s writings, and being the definition 
promoted by Andersson (1994), Kokko et  al. (2006), and empha-
sized by Shuker (2010; his “consensus definition,” see Roughgarden 
2015). We have explored alternative definitions, in particular those 
associated with a role for female resource competition and with the 
measurement of  sexual selection. We believe the definition pre-
sented here has many benefits, including being sex- and sex-role 
neutral, and agnostic about other components of  fitness. By doing 
so, it also acknowledges (or rather allows) sexual selection to be em-
pirically tangled up with other fitness components that will make 
the measurement and interpretation of  sexual selection problem-
atic. We should expect that though, and in such cases the utility 
of  holding to our names for individual fitness components starts to 
be called into question anyway; all evolutionary biologists are pop-
ulation geneticists at heart, whether they like it or not. Our main 
aim in writing this paper though is to allow the next generation of  
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sexual selection researchers to address the many questions still left 
unanswered without the baggage of  the definition of  sexual selec-
tion left lying around. Sexual selection may be complicated, but its 
definition, we believe, is simple.
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